一个会话就起源

12评论
11月20日发布,2008年哲学 标签:

杰尼说:

让我问你一个问题的所有无神论者那里:如果某种上帝没有创造宇宙(或至少它背后的规律),然后什么 我们的宇宙是怎么来到这里? 而且,顺便说一下,回答,“它总是存在的,”不是一个答案。 毕竟,这等于说,“上帝总是存在的,”如果一个很好的无神论者可以不相信这一点,那么他应该不会相信“宇宙的始终存在”了!

这不是恰恰在我而来,但我喜欢自己的声音的my声音/键盘这么多,我无法抗拒反驳。


您可以使用这些链接跳讨论各种问题。 或者,不理会他们,只是继续阅读。

我的第一反应

杰尼的第一答复

我的第二个反应

杰尼的第二次答辩

我的第三个反应



阿呆科学家写的

嗯, 以前有资格回答这个问题,我的神学观点有变化不大,因为我是一个无神论者,我才真正改变了明确的安排,我的标准。 也就是说,我现在更为谨慎。

无论如何,我作为一个简单的答案弱不可知论是,毫不奇怪,我根本不知道如何解决我所说的问题根源 即使我是一个强大的无神论者我从来没有假装知道宇宙是从哪里来的。 我是来等方面,与我的无知,我宁愿继续为寻找答案,而不是接受一个答案可能是错的。 (我不是说有神论者必然是被草率,他们可能已经审查了关于一个比我更深层次的问题,并找到答案的问题,我感到困惑。)

但是,现在的时间越长回答: 为何我不知道如何解决的起源问题。

首先,我认为是无神论者是错误的认为,宇宙一直存在, 实验表明,它的存在闪入约13700万年前。 我也同意这一点至少让更多的意义说,上帝的“永恒的”,因为我们没有证据表明他开始不断在现有的任何特定时间点。 他的其他素质是无限的,所以很适合他的存在一致的无限延长在至少一个方向的时间(如果不是两者)。

但是我不相信,“上帝这样做,是”可以解决任何问题产生的根源。 我知道上帝的存在,没有明确的开始,所以因果关系,因为我们知道这并不完全适用于他。 但由于时间与大爆炸开始 ,我不相信因果关系适用于它的。 因此,我感到困惑,为什么上帝也是为了使第一届特别引人注目的原因选择。 到底是为什么最好给别人留下一些无法解释的神的存在,原因不明,而不是? (原因除了第一的事实,他的定义是,这说法似乎类似的本体不满意的论点,我觉得完全。)

事实上,很多我周围的混乱中心的神学家说,上帝是“永恒”和(大家都知道)永恒的对象是不言自明的,因为他们从来没有开始。 因此,即使它显然愚蠢的认为,宇宙的存在,需要的不是解释,上帝的存在是一个先验的事实,因为他属于一类特殊的对象与属性“永恒”,基本上解释自己。

这是我迷路。 我们怎么知道,即使存在着永恒的对象,更遑论知道他们什么性质?

  • 有没有人发现任何证据的一个永恒的? (除了上帝,指的是他的理由永恒对象的属性,似乎有点在这方面。)

  • 我们的逻辑似乎是在描述一个合理有效的宇宙是古老而辽阔的(但在年龄有限的,如果不是在空间范围),似乎充满短暂的对象只。 但是,为什么要我相信这种逻辑可以那么容易地扩展到评估对象的解释能力是永恒的自我?

  • 这是一个显而易见的事实,我只是应该一看就知? “上帝是永恒的,因此证明一个简单的手段, 所以它不需要予以表述 ,他的出身,无须解释。”

坦率地说,我不明白为什么有些有神论者似乎认为,上帝的起源问题解决了。 它看起来只是买卖的断言他们已经为一个又一个任意的,所以我必须是失去了一些东西。 这不会是我第一次错过一个关键细节,其他人看到...请,任何神学家那里出来,救救我!

我之所以说这是一个武断的说法是,我能想到至少另外一个可能的解决方案。 假设而不是选择一首死因(即基于特征的时空永恒主场迎战短暂),我选择它的逻辑基础上的必要性 使用这个标准,似乎将是数学的法律是个完美的第一原因。

换句话说,我是说“1 +1 = 2”是唯一的类型声明,我愿意接受没有证据属实。 我提议的起源问题的回答可能是由文字组成的数学现实

我的第一原因的选择是一样的有神论者',但我几乎本能开出的任意水平。 数学只是感觉更涉及基本高于一切我研究,因为它没有任意的假设,至少我没有承认。 举例来说,我无法想象如何“1 +1 = 2”是可以改变的,但我想我想象一个宇宙的所有不同的物理规律,宇宙存在的或根本没有。 我什至想我可以想像没有神,或有多个神宇宙的宇宙。 对数学的法律,另一方面,一成不变的确定性似乎像我,比任何其他声明,除了一些“我思故我在。”

现在的问题(对我来说,我猜)是要“向上数学”法则,看看从物理定律可以从它们派生的方式解释了所有的“微调”常量,我们的理论垃圾。 换言之,一个单一的物理理论,不仅需要能够解释所有的实验,它也必须严格合理的,而不会前进的道路上,所有的方式回到数学公理任何额外的假设。 (顺便说一句,我相信,如果微调常量解释的宇宙常数存在许多不同的同时,这些平行宇宙需要证伪的才行。)

我不会考虑的起源问题的解决,直到有一个物理学家的一切,像这样的工程理论:

  1. 首先选择一个数学公理。 (我还不能说一套。)

  2. 在这里插入大量的推理,包括可能非常复杂的数学,所有这些都来自于#1的公理流动。

    (但不包括实验数据或平行宇宙unfalsifiable假设,以帐户为精细物理常数的任何调整。)

  3. 其结果是所有的预测的物理常数和任何可能的实验台。

老实说,这似乎是这样一个困难的目标,我可能不会活着看到它实现,而唯一的,如果是有可能的话! 我很感兴趣,看看是否有一个更快或更容易的方式方法的起源问题。 任何人吗?



撰稿杰尼

好吧,那你的主张是非常合情合理的。 具体来说,一部分是关于:

另一方面,我不认为“上帝这样做,是”可以解决问题的根源之一。 我知道上帝的存在,没有明确的开始,所以因果关系,因为我们知道这并不完全适用于他。 但由于时间与宇宙大爆炸开始,我不能确定因果关系适用于它的。 因此,我感到困惑,为什么上帝也是为了使第一届特别引人注目的原因选择。 它到底是为什么离开,而不是最好离开别的原因不明的神的存在无法解释的?

我完全同意:神是不更是一个引人注目的选择比第一个原因背后的大爆炸或任何其他物理为基础的宇宙创造的故事(不完全)物理学。 但要打开它的头你的逻辑,也没有现代物理学的国家产生了一个更引人注目的原因首先选择比回答“上帝”给!

我读过一个由卡尔萨根(我自己的他的非技术性工作,其实最)和有关的事情总是发生在宇宙形成的讨论我等等一大堆的事情之一是他的单位出坚持认为没有上帝/神的存在。 现在,你可以使一个漂亮的令人信服的理由,一个特定的,类似人类的神(上帝直接或喇叭),如耶稣,穆罕默德,亚伯拉罕,等,等不存在或没有真正的神。 但是,说“有没有造物主”并不那么简单。 我的意思是,你可以使用物理回去一个可怕的时间很长的路...,但你还不能说什么“开始”的宇宙。 即使我们最终理解宇宙后,(第1e中,创造一个后,第二个40多创造的第二个完整的原则,最后的一小部分),我们还是要面对的问题:谁离开或什么都设立了“宇宙规则”?

现在,一个无神论者会回答:“有些事情我们不明白呢。”这是一个完全有效的回答我。 麻烦的是,我看不出任何区别之间说和说,“上帝。”毕竟,什么叫“上帝”(在一般意义上,而不是具体的人,名叫神一样的感觉)除了“我们的东西不明白,但“??? 这就是我与喜欢萨冈铁杆无神论者的问题:他们认识到有一些他们不明白,但生气(或者,更经常地,顽固地傲慢)当别人承认同样的事情,并给它命名为“上帝”。 它成为一个伟大的辩论和语义的标签,在我看来。

现在,然后,以大约为第一原因的数学辉煌您的意见。 这里是我的问题:数学是一个完全任意的系统定义为有意义的讨论身边的事情人类。 这并不意味着它的“错误”,本身,而是有没有什么根本的,这使我非常使用的任何一个公理排序持怀疑态度。 真的,它没有比语言不同,就像两个人能说两种不同的语言同样准确地都没有使用相同的关键字时,两个人可以选择来描述相同的实际,物理现象,不同的只是使用不同的设置和定义数学。

两个简单的例子:

  1. 你选择“作为一个真实的东西,就是始终例如1 +1 = 2”。 但事实并非如此。 事实上,它也同样对我来说正确的写:“1 + 1 = 10”。 为什么? 因为我将使用二进制,而不是十进制符号。 我用这个作为证据,而愚蠢的例子,数学只是人类的“语言”,因此完全任意的。 该系统的数学是定义可能是非任意的,当然,但数学本身只不过是描述这个系统,不是唯一的方法更方便的方法。

  2. 经典的“寻找两点之间的距离”的问题。 比方说,我们有一个网格,一个在(2点的x,y)=(0,0)和其他(1,1)。 他们除了多远? 那么,通常的方法来解决这个问题是说,通过距离d发现:Ð ^ 2 = delx ^ 2 +德利^ 2。 或者换句话说,Ð =的sqrt(2)。 但是,这只是因为我们界定的数学方法。 如果不是,我用了“出租车度量”,在那里你只能直线移动上/下和侧面,而不是对角,然后在距离变得d_taxicab = delx +德利= 2。 这些答案是不相同,但它们都有效的测量距离的方法。 另一个任意数学内斯的例子。

一个更“现实”这个问题的例子是问“如何远离波士顿是芝加哥?”多数人会退出一张地图,并从那里直接回答。 但是,这只会告诉你多远围绕地球表面的两个城市之外。 为什么我们使用了“直接”在线测量(这在通过地球的过程中,)的测量? 毕竟,它是利用三维出租车度量等价!

嗯,因为大多数活动,它的更有益。 数学是非常善于被有用。 这就是我们设计它(和语言)。 但是,“最有用的方法”并不等于“唯一方法”,因为我试图在这里显示。 如果连“基础数学”,同样可以很容易地,有效地定义为许多不同的事情,那么我很清楚,这些基本能力,作为一个公理组有效的服务立足宇宙的奥秘后,持怀疑态度!

事实上,如果你会走这路线:申报正确的“未知”的选择来描述事物不是“神”,而是“数学”,我建议你改变你的“数学”选择“的“基础物理学。 毕竟,你真的想你的基础结构是“法律”是宇宙运行的,对不对? 那么,数学不仅是这些法律。 这些法律一般指在数学方面,是的,但仅此而已。 数学并不能使宇宙的工作,它只是描述了它(在任意的,而是常用的方式)。



阿呆科学家写的

我完全同意:神是不更是一个引人注目的选择比第一个原因背后的大爆炸或任何其他物理为基础的宇宙创造的故事(不完全)物理学。 但要打开它的头你的逻辑,也没有现代物理学的国家产生了一个更引人注目的原因首先选择比回答“上帝”给!

他们同样武断的,我同意。 我只是个人更吸引到数学出一种模糊的现实主义“奥卡姆的剃刀”的感觉。

我的意思是,你可以使用物理回去一个可怕的时间很长的路...,但你还不能说什么“开始”的宇宙。 即使我们最终理解宇宙后,(第1e中,创造一个后,第二个40多创造的第二个完整的原则,最后的一小部分),我们还是要面对的问题:谁离开或什么都设立了“宇宙规则”?

这正是这类问题我试着回答。 只是要明确,我认为设立宇宙所有的“规则”是这样的过程:

  1. 选择一个特定的子集的数学体现在物理定律。 例如,本科生量子力学需要放置在一维无限希尔伯特空间和重力为4D描述微分几何弯曲的应力能量张量。 量子电动力学是描述一个阿贝尔(即交换的,我相信) 规范理论与对称群U(1) -圆对称的旋转。

    (也许这些子集都不是真正体现在物理定律。它们更可能是含有亚群是足够接近我们的原油愚弄实验物理定律。)

  2. 一旦选择了数学子集,即参数化的物理规律任意常数需要微调,以便生活。

    (或者,至少,表观微调需要在证伪的方式解释。)

因此,一个“规则如何设置”需要理解为什么我们看到的是物理数学的一个子集内包含的一个子集,而不是另一个随机充分的解释。 这个问题似乎难以克服的对我说:我不知道宇宙的数学基础的子集,甚至可以对不同的存在 ,更遑论如何这个想法可能是伪造的。

我完全忽略的可能性,物理学的基本法律是不是所有的数学出于同样的原因。

任意微调常量手,另一方面,似乎有点容易接近。 这一天体现宇宙存在同样的物理规律,但有可能通过不同的物理常数被检验的实验之一。 否则,这个“微调”,最终似乎喜欢设计的结果。 这将会是很高兴看到,有证据,有没有必要调整罚款,因为(例如)许多宇宙存在,这些常数与每个不同的值。

这一立场是相似的,我并不感到惊讶,地球很舒服,有荒凉的行星,那里的很多,我们根本没有进化上的原因。 目前单身“微调宇宙”的情况似乎更类似于一个宇宙是一回事,除了太阳和地球。 在这种情况下,地球的田园诗般的性质似乎可疑微调, 人择原理尽管。

现在,一个无神论者会回答:“有些事情我们不明白呢。”这是一个完全有效的回答我。 麻烦的是,我看不出任何区别之间说和说,“上帝。”毕竟,什么是“上帝”(在一般意义上,而不是具体的人,名叫神一样的感觉)除了“我们的东西不明白,但“??? 这就是我与喜欢萨冈铁杆无神论者的问题:他们认识到有一些他们不明白,但生气(或者,更经常地,顽固地傲慢)当别人承认同样的事情,并给它命名为“上帝”。 它成为一个伟大的辩论和语义的标签,在我看来。

如果一个泛神论声称未知“的东西”是上帝,我可能会同意。

但谁是有神论者相信上帝是个人的索赔作出更加复杂:通过确定“东西”为上帝,那“东西”来包装的个性就像一个所有属性种,目标导向行为, 无所不能无所不知omnibenevolence

老实说,我所知道的是,“我们不明白的东西还”创造了宇宙。 人们可以相信,不管他们想要的,当然,它从来没有让我生气。 迷惑,是的...我只是不知道如何使所有这些额外的素质是合理的基础上,专题手。

我知道你用的是“上帝”在更广泛的意义在这里,但我得承认很少人相信了他们谁跟我在上帝似乎是严格的泛神论。 在我看来,泛神论是拉动一唯一谁不 “诱饵和开关”上帝演习使用的起源问题的争论存在。

现在,然后,以大约为第一原因的数学辉煌您的意见。 这里是我的问题:数学是一个完全任意的系统定义为有意义的讨论身边的事情人类。 这并不意味着它的“错误”,本身,而是有没有什么根本的,这使我非常使用的任何一个公理排序持怀疑态度。 真的,它没有比语言不同,就像两个人能说两种不同的语言同样准确地都没有使用相同的关键字时,两个人可以选择来描述相同的实际,物理现象,不同的只是使用不同的设置和定义数学。

短版本:我不同意。

龙版本:

数学物理学时, 似乎任意使用,但我认为这不仅是因为它很难选择数学的一个子集,其中包含一个完全精确的物理理论。 可以很容易地选择一个子集,在足够接近的预测结果来欺骗当代实验。 例如,牛顿认为重力场描述可以由一个三维向量,但爱因斯坦给我们展示了如何更准确的预测采用数学子集, 远远陌生。 量子引力,恐也新奇。 谁知道如果我们足够聪明,作为一个物种,以获取最终的一切理论和数学的一个子集什么样子

如果这是有史以来的一个子集数学的最终确定,我认为任何剩余的“任意性”只是一个符号无趣的事。 换句话说,我可以写双方的方程3乘以一个额外的因素,还是在我的计算基数2按照你的建议,或者使用不同的度量,或选择一组不同的轴...这些例子看起来语义 - 仅仅是翻译问题。

你看,我刚才谈到数学,我用“1 +1 = 2”作为一个简单的例子。 我真的很想名单基本概念想了解更多的身份传递性 我想提的定理存在性唯一性 因为正是我最终寻找的是一个存在定理证明宇宙大爆炸是一次不可避免的某些数学假设是,跟一个唯一性定理,解释了明显的罚款或调整的宇宙(1证伪的多元宇宙理论的我'米不挑剔)。

这会是好的知道为什么会是体现数学的一个子集,而不是任何其他,但这是一种恐吓的问题。 此外,任何公理数学面临的挑战,哥德尔不完备性定理 我只是不明白这些定理也还不足以评估的损害。 任何逻辑学家欢迎告诉我,我的做法是注定,虽然。 我不想浪费我的时间!

我意识到,许多子集包含大约数学物理理论有效。 我无法想象一个宇宙中的数学理论为基础的子集相交的两个非转出同样有效地在所有的物理定律描述到最后十进制。 在这个意义上说,数学不仅仅是一种语言给我。 数学是我的指路明灯限制对知识的追求几乎是比较有效地预测到实验。

事实上,如果你会走这路线:申报正确的“未知”的选择来描述事物不是“神”,而是“数学”,我建议你改变你的“数学”选择“的“基础物理学。 毕竟,你真的想你的基础结构是“法律”是宇宙运行的,对不对?

当我“的基本物理想:”我觉得对数学的进入实体法所体现的特定子集,以及参数化的常量,这些法律的特殊价值。 我不想认为他们是为正是因为你给的第一个原因:我倒想知道如果这些从任意常数来摆在首位。

这就是为什么我设置我的目标更高,我想我开始与一些特殊子集数学(还不能说一个子集)。 然后,我希望以某种方式得到我们观察调整常数的法律,从物理学的一个子集的方式,falsifiably解释了所有的罚款。

我不希望我的基地有什么不同的逻辑结构上的“宇宙运行的法律,”这么多,我想像要依据它的法律,我不能 我可以想像体现了数学物理定律不同子集,我可以想像是不同的物理常数。 所以,我不愿离开物理定律无法解释的,它可以像他们似乎有所不同,如果他们甚至略有不同,我们可能不具有这样的谈话,因为生活就不会存在。



撰稿杰尼

当然,如果我们的宇宙只是众多宇宙之一,稍有不同的“规则”,那么它很可能是宇宙(的形成)将仍然是一个问题,我们不 - 或者甚至不能 - 明白。 毕竟,如果我们的宇宙是在自身之外(其中,如果有多个不同的宇宙,几乎都必须如此),那么它肯定是使用了一种“规则”,这是有意义的地方是集创建。 而且,由于没有在我们的经验表明,在创造宇宙继“规则”允许从不同的套在我们的宇宙,这表明了“规则在手”在创建过程中不完全的,我们的宇宙如下。 所以,即使我们在某一天完全理解“规则我们的宇宙”,这将无助于至少我们了解外面的规则!

我仍然不同意对数学或物理的相对重要性时说到,明确这些“规则”和你在一起。 数学和物理都是工具。 良好的工具,在我看来,但仍然只是工具,我们可以用它来确定真正的“规则”。 现在,我想你能做出像样的论点,即物理(或一般科学)应该是一个充满了这些“规则”概念的了解,从而,对理想的完善的science国家是在“规则准确representation”自己。 但数学不应该是一个什么代表! 数学是数学只是...。 一个工具。

我有1.5年的毕业生,在同一数学教授,所以我就知道他很好。 他走进课堂一天绝对跳疯了。 约10分钟到演讲,他打破了在一个问题中宣布:“我不能相信! 那些愚蠢的物理学家了我的数学和实际使用它! 我会写在一片模糊数学beautifullly我整个论文,他们变成了弦理论的一部分! 这是完美的,纯粹的! 他们去,并用它!“

现在,我承认,在他的全班同学笑了,因为他明显的凹凸(而且我还在发抖我现在在纪念头),但这个故事的关键是数学CAN be是“纯粹”和无关的那些“rules “我们在谈论什么。 这是因为它只是一个工具,工具的有用性就取决于我们如何使用它们。 (更多的是因为相同的方式一锤锤仍然是一个即使你只使用它作为纸镇。)您如何使用数学来定义这些“规则”的理论是很好的 - 甚至权利,我想。 但是,仅仅是因为我们已经学会如何使用我们的数学“锤精确和无(多!)混乱”。 的部分,使得在计算出这些“规则”方面,数学有用的是不是数学本身,它的背后,数学的理由。 而我们通常称之为理解“科学”。



阿呆科学家写的

而且,由于没有在我们的经验表明,在创造宇宙继“规则”允许从不同的套在我们的宇宙,这表明了“规则在手”在创建过程中不完全的,我们的宇宙如下。

我很好奇的想法,黑洞的形成产卵 1时空正交我们的。 它甚至有人建议,这一过程会改变一些机制,我不明白(物理常数),在“女儿与不同的物理常数的宇宙”产生的。 这个想法甚至可以证伪的,它可能已留下了一个“指纹宇宙”在早期的通货膨胀率,例如。

更奇怪的是,宇宙可能会受到他们的自然选择自己的类型,如果他们要争取资源或“空间”在一些高立体感()。 如果这是真的,它讽刺的是,他们不会选择终身兼容,而是为黑洞最有效的创作...

这只是一个疯狂的假设,我提到这不仅是因为它似乎有关。 你说得对,多套规则可能最终需要,我们甚至还没有开始研究,以便正确地在这一点上很少能排除这些问题。

...故事的一点是,数学可以是“纯粹”和无关的那些“规则”我们在谈论什么。

我同意。 三维向量场是“纯粹的”,但他们似乎只是描述重力的实际规则有很大的不同。 此外,也有可能许多“纯”法律亚群的数学物理不包含任何逼近。 换句话说, 所有的数学集可能是大于工会的所有子集的物理规律的数学结构,其中包含类似。 (我这样说是因为有一个附加的约束物理,数学不同意:实验。)

我认为真正的问题是,我们正在讨论这个问题太早了几个世纪。 目前,它可能的数学研究作为人类的工具,任意只是让近似的答案。 但我的直觉是,宇宙的基本规则必须以数学为基础。 我不能想象的结果,其中也同样是宇宙公理描述两个(或更多数目) 不同组相同的物理定律与(每个)到任意精度。

因此,我作为一个数学知识指导。 例如,我放弃了哥本哈根公理简化设置的解释和量子力学的一致性数学赞成的许多世界解释的基础兆瓦的单纯。

同样,我个人的直觉是我选择的唯一原因是我的第一个原因数学现实。 我很高兴其他人采取不同的办法,问题的根源。 我这样说是因为如果我错了,我对知识的追求,最终注定要失败的。 虽然这可能让我感到难过,我觉得在别人的事实,进行不同方向搜索慰藉。

为了他们,我这样说:学习从我的错误,避免类似的自己。 我的想法反复发作,并宣读我的心灵与开放的批评所有的工程。 不要以为我知道我在说什么。 因为我通常不喜欢。


更新:

仿佛在暗示,这里的更多证据,我不知道我在说什么。 我一直在使用“第一原因”,但在审查阿奎那的五证中,“必然的存在”似乎更为合适。 我这样说是因为我的位置取决于应变 ,而不是因果关系。

它仍然不准确,因为这个词“是”意味着人格,但我想不出一个更好的词。 很抱歉的混乱...

最后修改2008年12月8日
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12回应“一个会话就起源”

  1. (编注:我通过电子邮件发送的著名布雷特沃森,并要求他对此有何评论文章,因为他没有这样一个出色的工作在这里 。)

    我只是试图回答这个问题:“如果上帝没有创造宇宙,什么?”

    我不知道我能有助于这一调查线索。 通过简短的一瞥,令我有一个基本假设中发挥了很多,我不知道哪些是你认为根本的,或他们只是事实上,你有没有想过到问题的立场。

    我觉得它更富有成效争论至少有一些其他人的基本信念的知识,因为这是“理性”为他们定义。 我知道你的一些合理性的品牌,但还不足以将它应用到您所提出的问题。 而是采取一种系统化的方法,那么,我将通过扫描文章,使一些随机的评论,只是为了挑起事端一点。 (我不打算把重点放在你的发言,特别是 - 我就看commentable任何评论。)

    如果某种上帝没有创造宇宙(或至少它背后的规律),然后什么

    这个问题本身带来了一些假设,表,在那不是很清楚的。 什么是我们所说的“创造”? 什么是我们所说的“宇宙”? 我认为前一个问题隐藏了更多的争议。 如果没有别的,问题是假定了有些种类的创意机构是必要的。

    有一个因果关系为基础的一种思想在这里是有问题的本身。 从应急队伍和其他分类为必要时,需要必要的基础作为论据队伍一些事情,从而产生了一所必需的想法。 I'm inclined to pull a kind of Kantian wildcard on this line of thought, and question whether the categories of "contingent" and "necessary" are only valid when applied within certain bounds. By that interpretation, the concept of the Necessary Being is not sufficient to prove it exists: the absence of the Necessary Being would simply prove that we've over-stepped the proper bounds of reason somewhere.

    Maybe I'm just a tad sceptical about the concept of Necessity. My scepticism tends to grow in proportion to the alleged universality of the principle. Maybe the whole "contingency/necessity" thing is a way in which we categorise the world, and is suitable only for classifying objects of experience, not for deriving Ultimate Truths.

    I also agree that it makes at least a little more sense to say that God's "eternal" because we have no evidence that He ever began existing at any particular point in time.

    Theists who use the word "eternal" tend not to mean that God's existence extends infinitely along both directions of the time axis. They imply that time itself is a finite dimension with at=0 prior to which the dimension does not even exist. Spacetime is thus finitely bounded in at least one direction. I don't know which model of spacetime is currently in vogue amongst those who like to ponder that sort of thing, but you should at least be familiar with the concept, yes?

    With this in mind, "eternal" means that God exists outside the dimensions of spacetime with which we are familiar. Also, we have a special relationship with the time dimension in that we perceive ourselves as being in motion along it. An eternal being has no such relationship with time, or at least not with the dimension we call "time".

    My confusion centers around the fact that many theologians say that God is "eternal" and– as we all know– eternal objects are self-explanatory because they never had beginnings.

    Self explanatory? Not my choice of words. If you hypothesise dimensions beyond our own, it's not clear what sort of science you can do on them, so "beyond scientific explanation" might be more apt. If natural science (the study of nature) is your only tool, of course, this arbitrary placing of things out of (your) reach won't sit comfortably. On the other hand, if you start with "science is the answer", I suppose you'll have to rule out a few questions.

    I won't consider the Origins problem solved until physicists have a theory of everything that works like this:

    I see a problem with your research programme. Although the programme of physics is (at present) to describe all events in the universe in mathematical terms, it's not at all clear that mathematics can imply anything about the universe. As a thought experiment, ask yourself "what impact would it have on mathematics if there were no physical universe as such?" Clearly this would have an impact on mathematicians — there would be none — but if there were no time, no space, and no laws of physics, would mathematics itself be even slightly fazed? Would "1+1=2" be even slightly less certain?

    If mathematics is compatible with the non-existence of everything else, then it can't sufficiently explain the universe as it is, can it? You'd additionally need to prove (at least) that it is necessary for something to exist, and such a necessity is not mathematical in nature.

    I think that mathematics is like a set of train tracks: it provides the road on which the freight can be carried, but tells us nothing of the freight itself. Given a train on the tracks at some point, you can tell where it's going, but the tracks themselves don't give you the train.

    After all, what is "God" (in the general sense, not the specific human-like named deity sense) besides "something we don't understand yet"???

    I have to say I find this statement pretty baffling. Why use "God" in two wildly different senses like this? There are numerous other words that one could use for the concept, "something we don't understand yet", like "mystery". Not all mysteries demand "God" as an explanation. Consider the question, "hey, who ate the last slice of pizza?" A mystery it may be to the person posing the question, but I doubt that anyone but a cartoonist would suggest "God" as the answer.

    Of course, the deal with atheists like Carl Sagan and Richard Dawkins is that in their view of things God is superfluous. When they speak of mysteries, the only mysteries they allow are "laws of physics yet to be discerned". The origin of the universe is such a mystery to them. For an Orthodox Jew, on the other hand (given my understanding of Judaism), the origin of the universe is no mystery at all: God spoke, and it was. The disagreement that follows between the two parties rests on the sort of thing which they accept as an explanation. Sagan and Dawkins reject the Jewish explanation purely because it's not the kind of thing they permit as a law of physics.

    Frankly, all I know is that "something we don't understand yet" created the universe. People can believe whatever they want, of course, and it never makes me angry. Confused, yes… I just don't know how all these extra qualities are justified based on the topic at hand.

    This is a product of your approach to answering the question. You want to be able to reach a conclusion using the combination of your brainpower and observation of the world around you. Sometimes that approach leads to theism, sometimes (as in your case) it doesn't. I can only conclude that the result is under-determined by the method. There's probably a lot of personal taste entering into the process undetected. You don't see the need for God to be a person; others can't see how "personhood" can exist at all unless it is a property of God. I'm not sure how one can decide between those two positions other than to adopt the one to which one feels the most inclination, as Mill puts it.

    You see, when I talked about math earlier, I used "1+1=2? as a quick example. I really wanted to list more fundamental concepts like identity and transitivity.

    How about the law of the excluded middle? Not all logics accept it, "fundamental" (to some of them) though it be.

    It'd be nice to know why that subset of math was embodied rather than any other, but that's an intimidating problem.

    It's also contingent on the laws of physics remaining unchanged. We already have some reason to question the constancy of certain fundamental "constants", like the speed of light. Then again, maybe these things are actually variables which have settled down into steady states. That's a different twist on your research programme: not that constants are constants by mathematical necessity, but that they would tend towards certain constants if they were variable!

    Also, any set of math axioms faces challenges from Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

    Only if it's trying to prove itself complete and consistent, in which case Gödel will give your nice set of axioms an atomic wedgie.

    Math is a guiding light that constrains my search for knowledge almost as effectively as comparing predictions to experiments.

    In which case you should be a man of many doubts. Simple things like the three-body problem should leave you in a state of despair. Most of the laws of physics as we formulate them lead to non-computable results. Oh sure, we can approximate them, but sometimes approximation is about like throwing a dart at a map. Most real-world systems are not just non-computable, but also chaotic. All that mathematics adds up to a mass of unpredictable results, even before you add quantum nondeterminism into the mix.

    I don't want to base my logical structure on the "laws which run the universe" so much as I want to base it on laws which I can't imagine being any different .

    Is this going to tell us more about the universe, or about the limits of your imagination?

    Of course, if our universe is just one of many universes with slightly different "rules", then it's likely that the formation of the universe(s) is going to remain a problem which we don't — or maybe even can't — understand.

    Personally, I can explain the existence of n universes for n =0. I have roughly equal amounts of trouble with all other values of n . Maybe some folks think the problem is easier for an indefinite n , such as "anything that can exist, does exist". Maybe that makes for an easier description of what exists, but it completely fails to address the question of why the heck anything can exist at all.

    That will do for now. See if there's anything in that pile of random commentary that inspires anything.

    的问候,

    TFBW

    • Wow, thanks! You've raised a lot of very interesting points. I need to give your comments some serious thought before I respond…

    • I find that it's more productive to argue with at least some knowledge of the other person's fundamental beliefs, because this is what defines “rational” for them. I know some of your brand of rationality, but not enough to apply it to the question you've posed.

      I've tried to summarize my fundamental beliefs in this article .

      Self explanatory? Not my choice of words. If you hypothesise dimensions beyond our own, it's not clear what sort of science you can do on them, so "beyond scientific explanation" might be more apt. If natural science (the study of nature) is your only tool, of course, this arbitrary placing of things out of (your) reach won't sit comfortably.

      I'm really only uncomfortable with the claim that the Origins problem is proof of the existence of God. People who make this claim seem to ignore that the problem's simply been swept under the rug– that they now have to explain why God exists. If they address this issue at all, they do so by saying that it's absurd to question God's existence because He's eternal.

      I'm not bothered that many people choose to resolve the Origins question in this manner. (I'm certainly ignoring some problems in my attempts to answer the Origins question, so that'd be hypocritical of me.) I'm just curious to know why they seem to think it's anything but an arbitrary choice. (Note that I'm not necessarily including you in that group of people.)

      On the other hand, if you start with "science is the answer", I suppose you'll have to rule out a few questions.

      I'd rather say that science is a good method for producing models which correctly predict the results of experiments and observations. I don't think science is an answer… it doesn't even provide answers like religions claim to. Science can only give us models that are constantly updated with new evidence.

      If mathematics is compatible with the non-existence of everything else, then it can't sufficiently explain the universe as it is, can it? You'd additionally need to prove (at least) that it is necessary for something to exist, and such a necessity is not mathematical in nature.

      Nice thought experiment! I think you've identified another intimidating question that belongs with “What if the laws of physics aren't mathematical?” and “Why are the laws of physics contained within this math subset rather than another?”

      As you say, it seems impossible to predict anything about the universe based on pure math. I guess my goals are more humble; I'm more interested in removing roadblocks that stand in the way of describing the universe completely in terms of math. These roadblocks include:

      • The existence of fine-tuned constants in our theories of physics. I want to see some evidence or a good logical argument that this fine-tuning isn't an astonishing coincidence. (The anthropic principle doesn't impress me.)

      • Where did all the energy in the universe come from? Before we found that the universe is accelerating , I didn't think this was a problem. That's because a universe that re-collapses has negative gravitational energy that balances out the positive mass energy of all the stars and planets. But an accelerating universe isn't so easily explained. (Any smarter physicist want to help me out here?)

      • The Big Bang isn't explained to my satisfaction. While evidence that it happened is overwhelming, I'd like to see a coherent, falsifiable explanation of how it happened. Because it seems like time didn't exist prior to the Big Bang, this explanation probably won't hinge on causality.

      • We can't describe all fundamental physical processes in the universe with the same theory. Different phenomena have to be described by theories that can't be combined without inconsistencies. How embarrassing!

      My approach is limited in the sense that I'll probably never be able to say why the universe exists at all, or why the universe doesn't use some other set of laws. But if these roadblocks are ever removed, I'd be able to say that everything in the universe– at the most fundamental level– is just a manifestation of mathematics. Galaxies, planets and people would simply be emergent properties of that subset of math.

      I recognize that this type of explanation appeals to me only because I find it conceptually beautiful. And just to be clear, even though I say that I can't see a way to solve certain problems, I'm not saying that they're “out of reach” for anyone except me. I would never declare something to be “unknowable.” All I'll say is that these mysteries are beyond my meager skills.

      Anyway, thanks for pointing out that problem. I'd never heard such a clear explanation of the analytic-synthetic distinction before.

      This is a product of your approach to answering the question. You want to be able to reach a conclusion using the combination of your brainpower and observation of the world around you. Sometimes that approach leads to theism, sometimes (as in your case) it doesn't. I can only conclude that the result is under-determined by the method. There's probably a lot of personal taste entering into the process undetected.

      I mostly agree with you here. I've met too many intelligent theists to believe that there's an “obviously correct” theology. The conclusions we reach are based on the assumptions we make, which can't be evaluated by reason because reason depends on those very assumptions in order to function.

      It seems to me that the taste involved is more cultural than personal, though. Otherwise people wouldn't be so likely to share the religion of their parents.

      You don't see the need for God to be a person; others can't see how "personhood" can exist at all unless it is a property of God.

      Just to be clear, I don't see the need for the “Necessary Being” to be a conscious person based solely on the problem of Origins. Other approaches could succeed, though. For instance, credible historical evidence of divine intervention would be evidence that the Necessary Being is a person (called God). I say this because I don't think Spinoza's God would've parted the Red Sea, whereas it'd be in character for Yahweh .

      It sounds like you agree, because your justification of God's personhood seems to be based on something other than the Origins problem. I'm not entirely sure I understand what you're saying, though, so I might be wrong.

      How about the law of the excluded middle? Not all logics accept it, "fundamental" (to some of them) though it be.

      The law of the excluded middle is a good example of a math axiom I don't understand well enough yet to declare it “obviously true.”

      Also, any set of math axioms faces challenges from Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

      Only if it's trying to prove itself complete and consistent, in which case Gödel will give your nice set of axioms an atomic wedgie.

      I'm worried that assuming the existence of a theory of everything is equivalent to proving that theory complete and consistent.

      (Also, I don't think the phrase “atomic wedgie” is used often enough in philosophy debates. *slow clap* )

      In which case you should be a man of many doubts.

      Like you wouldn't believe…

      Simple things like the three-body problem should leave you in a state of despair. Most of the laws of physics as we formulate them lead to non-computable results. Oh sure, we can approximate them, but sometimes approximation is about like throwing a dart at a map. Most real-world systems are not just non-computable, but also chaotic. All that mathematics adds up to a mass of unpredictable results, even before you add quantum nondeterminism into the mix.

      I only turn to math when experiments/observations are unavailable or ambiguous when I'm trying to compare two theories. In that case, I think it's helpful to examine each theory for mathematical consistency, and see which theory has fewer axioms.

      The problems you describe are serious pragmatic hurdles; I deal with them in my day job as a computational physicist. But they don't bother me philosophically because they just seem like evidence of our inability to make perfectly accurate measurements and perform simulations with infinite precision.

      I don't want to base my logical structure on the "laws which run the universe" so much as I want to base it on laws which I can't imagine being any different .

      Is this going to tell us more about the universe, or about the limits of your imagination?

      This is certainly a serious ambiguity. I'm just not sure what else to rely on when approaching questions like this. Someone else's imagination, perhaps?

  2. Here are a few points which are by no means adequate — from philosophy and from cosmology — but which have become accepted by quite a few careful thinkers (certainly not all) on this subject (among them cosmologists, philosophers and theologians) as the, so far, least inadequate understanding of origins.

    First of all there are two different origin questions: that of the temporal origin (when did physical reality as we know it begin?) and the ontological origin (what is the ultimate source or explanation of reality?). These are very different, and the second is obviously much more fundamental. It is possible, as Thomas Aquinas and other medieval theologians recognized, that there may not have been a beginning to the universe or to physical material reality as we know it. But that does not mean that it explains itself, or has no further explanation. It still needs to be grounded in its existence and in the order and properties it manifests. That's simply because it is clear that it doesn't explain itself. That is, it still needs an ontological origin. The idea here is that whatever the ontological origin is, it effectively gives existence and order to the universe from all eternity. It is its ultimate and continuing source of being and ordered activity — or one may say that the universe participates in, and derives its existence, order and dynamism from this ultimate ontological origin or source. It is clear that this does not in any way demand a temporal origin — though it does not rule it out.

    Secondly, it is, from a purely philosophical perspective (which was eventually taken over into Jewish, Christian and Islamic theology) that this ontological origin is what most theologians and many philosophers would mean by “God.” “God” for them is much more than this, of course, as one who is revealed through prophets, saving persons, and community experiences as personal, loving, and in ongoing interaction with the believing communities, but God is also conceived certainly at least the Creator in this sense of ultimate ontological origin. We cannot have anything like an adequate concept of God — God is above and beyond our concepts. However, that does not mean that we cannot say something about God, and conclude that we need something like God as ultimate ontological origin to account for existence and order. Otherwise there is no answer to what certainly seem like legitimate questions: Why is there something rather than nothing? And Why this type of basic order — or any order at all — rather than some other kind? Otherwise we have to abandon the fundamental principle of sufficient reason at this point. What it does mean is that, though we can speak about God to some extent and what God does, we cannot come close to understanding or conceiving God — comprehending God.

    In your first response to Jenni, you mention that “causality as we know it doesn't exactly apply to Him (God).” That's perfectly correct! That's why in applying causality to God as the source of existence and order, we do so metaphorically or analogically. And refer to God as “the First or Primary cause” not because God is “first” temporally, but because God is the most basic, and as such unlike any other cause. God enables all other (secondary) causes, but does not substitute for them. Instead God as creator enables or empowers other things to be what they are — and gives them the relative autonomy and causal efficacy to operate according to their own innate dynamisms. We might say that as Creator God is the necessary condition for everything, but the sufficient condition for nothing.

    If we now go to contemporary cosmology, it is clear scientifically that the Big Bang is first of all not an event, and secondly not the temporal beginning of the universe. In fact, it is simply the past limit of the hotter, denser phases of the universe as we go back into the past, according to the standard, general relativistic model of space-time (Einstein). But it is clear that this model breaks down at very high energies (temperatures) — above 10^{32} K for three spatial dimensions. The Big Bang singularity is symptomatic of this break-down. And so quantum cosmologists are exploring other models which may eventually provide a reliable model of space-time in this high-energy, totally quantized regime. On the basis of these new insights, people have proposed many types of pre-Big-Bang scenarios, postulating an array of possible pre-Big-Bang physics and physical states, with the possibility that even time itself as we know it may not be a fundamental physical reality, but derivative of some primordial completely quantized configuration. The Wheeler-DeWitt equation for instance, which describes in semi-classical terms the wavefunction of the universe, does not contain time as parameter in its basic formulation.

    The points here are:

    1. The Big Bang is not either a temporal origin, nor, obviously, an ultimate ontological origin — it cannot and does not explain itself or what emerges from it.
    2. Any physical state in reality is preceded by another physical state.
    3. No physical configuration or cause, no matter how primordial provides — or can provide — an ultimate ontological explanation for existence or for order. To do that it would have be self-sufficient in its existence, and be self-explanatory in its characteristics and its ordered activity.

    Thus, though what we can determine about origins from physics and cosmology is limited, we can engage and describe those limits, and ask philosophical questions which transcend what physics can deal with. We can also postulate what is needed to answer those questions of origin, and say something — however inadequate –about what characteristics that source or ontological origin would have to possess. Philosophically, how do we determine whether that educated speculation is worthwhile or valid? Certainly not scientifically or mathematically! But if it leads to consistency — within the terms and uncertainties of the concepts, which we have to be very careful about! — and if it provides a secure basis for other philosophical investigations and accords with critiqued experience over the long term, and if no other competitors equal its explanatory success, then it seems to be that it does provide the least inadequate explanation for existence and order. Certainly its application in theology has also provided that discipline with singular successes — once you purify that from the gross distortions which have visited upon it.

    Furthermore, it is clear from this, too, that what the sciences discover and what philosophy and theology conclude — if they are properly pursued, interpreted and understood — cannot be in essential conflict. If they seem to be, then there has been a failure on one side or the other (or on both sides!) — often involving the overstepping of the limits of the disciplines themselves.

    These are a few points which may shed some light on origins.

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    • Thanks for your insights; I really appreciate you taking the time to help me.

      This is the first I've heard of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation and pre-Big Bang cosmologies. The notion that time could extend before the Big Bang is likewise news to me. How fascinating!

      I think I understand what you mean when you say the Big Bang isn't an event. If I'm right, you're saying that the Big Bang isn'ta clearly delineated event as much as a barrier to our current physical theories, like the “sound barrier” was. A more accurate physical theory will presumably reveal the Big Bang to be a an era of the universe which isn't qualitatively different than our own era– just hotter and denser.

      I'm still digesting most of the philosophy you discussed, but these points immediately spring to mind:

      But that does not mean that it [the universe] explains itself, or has no further explanation. It still needs to be grounded in its existence and in the order and properties it manifests. That's simply because it is clear that it doesn't explain itself.

      I agree with you here, but the problem is that I don't know why I agree with you. I don't know why I consider, say, the arbitrary constants that define our universe to be coincidences requiring explanation. For example, their current life-sustaining values might be the only logically possible values, eliminating the “fine-tuned” coincidence. Perhaps life can exist even in universes that seem inhospitable to us, albeit in a drastically different form. I just don't know.

      More abstractly, I'm having trouble putting into words the reason why I don't consider the universe to be self-explanatory. This might sound pedantic, but until I know what criteria I'm subconsciously applying to this question, I can't trust my judgment. How could I ever identify a “self-explanatory” entity if I don't know why I'm rejecting some entities as “non-self-explanatory”?

      To do that it would have be self-sufficient in its existence, and be self-explanatory in its characteristics and its ordered activity.

      I also think I agree with this statement. My confusion centers around the fact that nearly all theologians consider these characteristics to be synonymous with a personal God. They also assert that no other being can be self-explanatory– that a personal God is the unique solution to the Origins problem. They might be correct to say this, but I'm not convinced yet…

      Otherwise we have to abandon the fundamental principle of sufficient reason at this point.

      I'm considering this possibility, radical though it may seem. I tend to agree with The Famous Brett Watson (above) when he says:

      Maybe I'm just a tad sceptical about the concept of Necessity. My scepticism tends to grow in proportion to the alleged universality of the principle. Maybe the whole “contingency/necessity” thing is a way in which we categorise the world, and is suitable only for classifying objects of experience, not for deriving Ultimate Truths.

      Likewise, the principle of sufficient reason seems effective at handling most mysteries. But I'm not sure what the bounds of its proper application are.

      • The question of whether the Principle of Sufficient Reason has bounds on its proper application leaves us with an interesting choice.

        If the Principle is strictly universal, then there is an infinite regress of reasons. If every event must have a prior cause, and every entity must have a proper origin, then there is no escape. This is often rejected for both empirical and rational reasons. Experience gives us the law of increasing entropy, which makes us doubt the possibility that the chain of cause and effect can be infinite. If entropy always increases (and we know of no exceptions to this, given a closed system), then the chain of events must be bounded at least by maximum and minimum possible entropy. From a purely rational perspective, the infinite regress raises the question as to the strict universality of the Principle, particularly when applied to itself. That is, if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true, there must be a reason why it is true . Infinite regress can not supply this fundamental reason: it can only place the reason beyond reach at infinity.

        This gives rise to our second possibility: that the Principle is nearly universal. Due to the difficulty associated with the strictly universal view, we add an exception to the rule: the First Cause or Uncaused Cause. Under this revised formulation of the Principle, there is one exception: God. (This gives rise to the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God.) This solves the experiential difficulties by denying that the universe is infinite: instead, it has an origin which transcends the law of entropy. Similarly, this provides the Principle with a reason of its own: the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true because it reflects the will of God in his creation. That seems like an ad hoc explanation because it is an ad hoc explanation: once you have admitted that the Principle of Sufficient Reason can't be applied to God, then you're stuck with “because God wills it” or something similarly lame once you make that final leap backwards to the first cause.

        The third possibility is to deny the universality of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or at least to be openly doubtful as to its universality. This is akin to the “nearly universal” position, except that the “nearly” is deliberately vague. The trap here is that we don't really know whether any particular event, entity, or proposition has a reason behind it. Experience gives us evidence that everything happens with cause, but experience can never give us Universal Truths. Furthermore, when we extrapolate backwards from effect to cause, we have no way to determine whether our extrapolation is valid or not. If there was no prior cause, then the extrapolation is invalid, but that doesn't prevent us from reaching a conclusion: it merely results in an invalid conclusion (and no general means to detect the error). The major implications of this modest Principle of Sufficient Reason are twofold: first, it throws into doubt the validity of the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God; second, it throws into doubt most of science — particularly the portions of it which rest heavily on principles of Uniformity (such as anything to do with long ages or far reaches).

        A fourth possibility is to deny reason altogether. Neither proper science or proper philosophy are possible without reason, so this position doesn't require a lot of explanation. In fact, the position itself is one of strong anti-rationality, and can not be rationally explained without defeating itself.

        My observation here is that most Scientific Rationalists (and Dawkins in particular) tend to operate under the nearly universal model of Sufficient Reason. They tend to think that their cause-and-effect brand of thinking is absolutely best of breed — right up until they hit the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God. At that point, they abruptly switch into the more modest model of Sufficient Reason which doubts the validity of this argument. If they were consistent, they would either accept the Cosmological Argument, or be more sceptical of the validity of science itself when applied to long ages and far reaches (which assume not only Sufficient Reason but also much broader traits of universality and immutability).

        Is that a fair criticism? Does that four-way subdivision help clarify matters at all?

        • Sorry for being so late with this response. I was at a scientific conference when you posted, and went home immediately for Christmas where I was a little distracted. I also wanted to do your comment justice, because as usual your insightful analysis definitely helped clarify matters.

          If the Principle is strictly universal, then there is an infinite regress of reasons. If every event must have a prior cause, and every entity must have a proper origin, then there is no escape. This is often rejected for both empirical and rational reasons. Experience gives us the law of increasing entropy, which makes us doubt the possibility that the chain of cause and effect can be infinite. If entropy always increases (and we know of no exceptions to this, given a closed system), then the chain of events must be bounded at least by maximum and minimum possible entropy. From a purely rational perspective, the infinite regress raises the question as to the strict universality of the Principle, particularly when applied to itself. That is, if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true, there must be a reason why it is true . Infinite regress can not supply this fundamental reason: it can only place the reason beyond reach at infinity.

          I don't see how entropy applies to this problem. I usually regard Bolzmann's definition of entropy as being most fundamental. When I think about an infinite regress of cause/effect, I can't identify any microstates which are macroscopically indistinguishable. As a result, I don't see how entropy has anything to do with the principle of sufficient reason.

          Having said that, I completely agree that the principle of sufficient reason can't be strictly universal because, as you say, then there would have to be another reason why the Principle is true.

          This gives rise to our second possibility: that the Principle is nearly universal. Due to the difficulty associated with the strictly universal view, we add an exception to the rule: the First Cause or Uncaused Cause. Under this revised formulation of the Principle, there is one exception: God. (This gives rise to the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God.) This solves the experiential difficulties by denying that the universe is infinite: instead, it has an origin which transcends the law of entropy. Similarly, this provides the Principle with a reason of its own: the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true because it reflects the will of God in his creation. That seems like an ad hoc explanation because it is an ad hoc explanation: once you have admitted that the Principle of Sufficient Reason can't be applied to God, then you're stuck with “because God wills it” or something similarly lame once you make that final leap backwards to the first cause.

          This seems like a valid (but arbitrary, as you say) point at which to terminate the infinite regress of cause and effect. Out of all the alternatives you listed, this one sounds closest to my position. One important difference, though, is that I see no reason to think that the First Cause is a conscious person.

          The third possibility is to deny the universality of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, or at least to be openly doubtful as to its universality. This is akin to the “nearly universal” position, except that the “nearly” is deliberately vague. The trap here is that we don't really know whether any particular event, entity, or proposition has a reason behind it. Experience gives us evidence that everything happens with cause, but experience can never give us Universal Truths. Furthermore, when we extrapolate backwards from effect to cause, we have no way to determine whether our extrapolation is valid or not. If there was no prior cause, then the extrapolation is invalid, but that doesn't prevent us from reaching a conclusion: it merely results in an invalid conclusion (and no general means to detect the error). The major implications of this modest Principle of Sufficient Reason are twofold: first, it throws into doubt the validity of the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God; second, it throws into doubt most of science — particularly the portions of it which rest heavily on principles of Uniformity (such as anything to do with long ages or far reaches).

          ...

          My observation here is that most Scientific Rationalists (and Dawkins in particular) tend to operate under the nearly universal model of Sufficient Reason. They tend to think that their cause-and-effect brand of thinking is absolutely best of breed — right up until they hit the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God. At that point, they abruptly switch into the more modest model of Sufficient Reason which doubts the validity of this argument. If they were consistent, they would either accept the Cosmological Argument, or be more sceptical of the validity of science itself when applied to long ages and far reaches (which assume not only Sufficient Reason but also much broader traits of universality and immutability).

          I can't speak for anyone but myself; my problem with the Cosmological Argument isn't the abrupt truncation of cause-and-effect based reasoning that you believe bothers Dawkins. It's clear that the principle has to be truncated, and that truncation point might as well be called a First Cause. What confuses me is that I don't see any reason to believe that the First Cause has to be a conscious, omnibenevolent person like Yahweh or Allah.

          I strenuously disagree that “long ages” are based on an untestable assumption of uniformity. Uniformity isn't an assumption , it's a provisional conclusion drawn from centuries of astronomical observation. This conclusion is falsifiable because a single counter-example could prove it wrong.

          However, I agree that an assumption of immutability (what I call the assumption of a strictly objective reality) is an extraordinary claim that isn't sufficiently supported by evidence right now. All I'm willing to say is that I've never seen evidence contradicting a strictly objective reality, but I'm not reckless enough to make such a sweeping claim about the nature of reality based on my meager experiences.

          My preferred version of the principle of sufficient reason makes distinctions between entities, propositions and events:

          1. Every entity has a sufficient explanation for its existence. I don't see a reason to add any caveats to this version of the principle.

          2. Every proposition with non-contradictory alternatives has a sufficient explanation for why it's true. Thus I see no reason to justify “1+1=2″ because I see no alternatives, but I do see a need to justify the statement “water at standard pressure boils at 100 °C” because it seems like that proposition could be expressed differently without logical contradictions.

          3. Every event that could have occurred differently has a sufficient explanation for why it occurred. Thus I'm concerned by “fine tuned constants” inherent in the Big Bang, but I'll be satisfied with the Big Bang if those constants can eventually be shown to be the only logically consistent values. (Or I'd like to see a falsifiable multiverse theory– either discovery would provide a provisional answer to the question of Origins, in my opinion.)

          I don't see any compelling reason to declare the existence of God exempt from the principle in the same way “1+1=2″ is– there could be no God, one God, or multiple gods. As a result I'm uneasy with the claim that God's existence is outside the bounds of the principle of sufficient reason.

          This approach is necessarily subjective; other people will undoubtedly argue that “1+1=2″ could be different, or that God's existence is somehow axiomatically certain. My approach also doesn't really solve the Origins problem as you noted: I might be able to reduce the entire Universe to mathematics, but I'd never be able to explain why the Universe existed at all. But I think that these flaws are not unique to my approach, and I personally prefer my ad hoc bounds on the principle of sufficient reason.

  3. Jimmy posted on 2009-07-03 at 00:34

    I was reading a bunch of articles on your website. It led me to wonder about the effects of inflation and dark energy on black holes. I know the answer is probably either “we don't know enough to figure it out” or “the effect is too small to be significant.” However, it can't hurt to ask. :-)

    From what I understand, dark energy comes from space itself. So in a black hole, in the space between the singularity and the event horizon, shouldn't the dark energy contribute to the black hole's total mass (because of E=mc^2, of course)? But dark energy causes space to expand, so shouldn't the diameter of the event horizon increase as space expands? I guess this effect, if it occurs, is too small to be important in regular black holes and the expansion of space right now. However, during the early universe, wouldn't inflation cause any primordial black holes to increase in size the same way? Of course, if the primordial black holes created after the period of inflation, then this doesn't matter, right?

    • I was reading a bunch of articles on your website. It led me to wonder about the effects of inflation and dark energy on black holes. I know the answer is probably either “we don't know enough to figure it out” or “the effect is too small to be significant.” However, it can't hurt to ask. :-)

      Actually, there probably is someone capable of figuring this out. Unfortunately, I'm not that person. I have yet to take any serious graduate-level courses on general relativity, and I only barely understand the evidence for dark energy. Competing variants of dark energy such as quintessence and a resurrected cosmological constant are over my head.

      From what I understand, dark energy comes from space itself.

      I haven't seen any evidence for dark energy inhomogeneity, unlike dark matter which seems to exist mainly in halos around galaxies. Quintessence is one variant of dark energy that can vary spatially and temporally, so if that's the correct model then dark energy isn't necessarily uniform.

      So in a black hole, in the space between the singularity and the event horizon, shouldn't the dark energy contribute to the black hole's total mass (because of E=mc^2, of course)?

      Mass alone defines an object's gravitational field in Newton's theory, but gravity in general relativity is produced by the stress-energy tensor which also depends on the pressure. Since dark energy's pressure is negative, I think it would cause a black hole to be smaller but that depends on how much pressure each joule of dark energy exerts to see if its pressure contribution is larger than its mass-energy contribution.

      But dark energy causes space to expand, so shouldn't the diameter of the event horizon increase as space expands?

      Technically dark energy causes the expansion of the universe as a whole to accelerate . However, this is only known to be true about the universe on a very large scale– where individual galaxies are too small to worry about. I'm not sure that the conclusions drawn from our current measurements can meaningfully be extended to relatively tiny objects such as supermassive black holes, let alone their stellar mass cousins.

      I guess this effect, if it occurs, is too small to be important in regular black holes and the expansion of space right now.

      It's definitely not observable with today's technology, because we'd need some way to estimate the mass inside a black hole independently of the size of its event horizon. It might change the energy at which particle accelerators like the LHC would create miniature black holes but I don't even know the sign of this change, let alone how to begin estimating its magnitude.

      However, during the early universe, wouldn't inflation cause any primordial black holes to increase in size the same way?

      我不知道。 Maybe they would, but then again maybe they'd increase in size during inflation and then return to normal afterward. I'm no cosmologist, but I'll try to contact one and see what he thinks.

      Of course, if the primordial black holes created after the period of inflation, then this doesn't matter, right?

      Inflation supposedly took place 10 -36 seconds after the Big Bang. I've never seen any estimate of when primordial black hole production peaked. Since they were created by density fluctuations, it might be possible to obtain a limit on their creation time using the size of the fluctuations in the cosmic microwave background radiation.

      On a similar note, I've long been fascinated by the idea that black hole formation spawns a new universe.

      I've recently been toying with the idea that the Big Bang was caused by the collapse of a star in another universe. If that's true, could inflation itself have been caused by something like the infalling matter hitting the singularity or any inwardly-directed gravitational radiation emitted during the balding phase that immediately follows the formation of the event horizon? Would there be any way to experimentally verify a connection like this by comparing the nature of inflation to simulations of gravitational collapse? (Even if this isn't complete nonsense, quantum gravity would probably be needed to describe these events.)

      • Jimmy posted on 2009-07-03 at 00:45

        I've been fascinated by that idea that black holes spawn new universes too. I'm often skeptical that it is like the “cyclic universe” – a cool idea that probably wouldn't work. In any case, if black holes do evaporate due to Hawking radiation, then I would wonder if our own universe eventually evaporated away like that!

        I forgot that dark energy's negative pressure would have an effect. It seems like a complicated problem.

        • I'm often skeptical that it is like the “cyclic universe” – a cool idea that probably wouldn't work.

          Personally, I lost interest in the cyclic universe (also known as the oscillatory universe ) when the expansion of the universe was shown to be accelerating.

          Since oscillations seem to require Big Crunches , these models don't make much sense to me unless dark energy eventually changes sign and causes a Big Crunch which leads to the next oscillation. On the other hand, the wikipedia page points out that the Baum-Framptom model includes dark energy in its oscillations, and it was recently published in 2007.

        • The simple answer to your main question is that there is really no connection at all between dark energy and black holes. Black holes are the ultimate collapsed state of normal mass-energy. If dark energy turns out to be vacuum energy (the cosmological constant), as appears the most likely alternative, it cannot clump at all. It remains perfectly homogeneous throughout the universe. If dark energy is something else, it may clump, but would not directly be connected with the formation or constitution of black holes.

          There is, of course, a much deeper connection between inflation and dark energy. The only way we can really conceive of inflation occurring in the early universe is under the influence of a large amount of vacuum energy, which is a type of dark energy. This dark energy must be quickly transformed into the particles and radiation at the end of inflation. So, it's not at all clear if there is a relationship between the dark energy which drove inflation and the dark energy which we have evidence is driving the gentle acceleration of cosmic expansion now. It may be that the dark energy now may
          be a remnant of the dark energy left over from the very early universe.

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